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ABSTRACT: Language acquisition is often said to be a process of mapping words into pre-existing concepts. If that is 
right, then we ought to be able to obtain experimental evidence for the existence of concepts in prelinguis-
tic children. One line of research that attempts to provide such evidence is the work of Paul Quinn, who 
claims that looking-time results show that four-month old infants form “category representations”. This 
paper argues that Quinn’s results have an alternative explanation. A distinction is drawn between concep-
tual thought and the perception of comparative similarity relations, and it is argued that Quinn’s results can 
be explained in terms of the latter rather than the former. 
Keywords: concept acquisition, language learning, similarity 
 
1. Some basic assumptions and some basic questions 
Here are three basic assumptions that one might make about language learning: First, 
children interact with their nonlinguistic environment and on that basis acquire con-
cepts. Second, children interact with people speaking language and on that basis figure 
out which words express which concepts. Third, as a result, children come to be able 
to express their thoughts in words, and come to be able to recognize the thoughts that 
other people are expressing.  
 These assumptions do in fact underlie the leading theories of language acquisition 
in psychology today. According to Paul Bloom,  
Learning a word involves mapping a form, such as the sound “dog,” onto a meaning or concept, 
such as the concept of dogs. (2002, p. 89) 
According to Gregory Murphy, 
… a word gets its significance by being connected to a concept or a coherent structure in our 
conceptual representation of the world. To put it another way, the meaning is built out of con-
cepts. (2002, pp. 388-89) 
The question I want to address in this paper is whether there is any empirical evidence 
to support these basic assumptions. In particular, I will consider whether there is any 
experimental evidence for the claim that children do acquire concepts apart from lan-
guage. 
 We need to distinguish between two kinds of evidence that might be offered for 
the basic assumptions, direct and indirect. The indirect kind simply demonstrates that 
the basic assumptions are part of a thriving research program: they are more or less 
immediate corollaries of a general conception of the mind, which researchers take for 
granted in other areas of cognitive science as well. Moreover, within the framework of 
the basic assumptions about language learning there is a lively, empirically grounded 
debate over many details. According to that more general conception, cognition is in 
general a process of subsuming particulars under concepts, drawing general conclu-
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sions by means of inductive reasoning and then making inferences from those gener-
alizations. Specific issues that can be raised within the framework of the basic assump-
tions include: Does the child start out with very general concepts and specify kinds of 
thing within them, or does the child instead start out with very narrow concepts and 
abstract?1 Does the child rely on syntactic cues to discover the meanings of words, or 
does the child instead learn syntax on the basis of an independent grasp of meanings?2
 The problem with relying exclusively on this kind of indirect evidence for the basic 
assumptions is that this kind of evidence does not provide sufficient reason to set 
aside certain basic questions—philosophical questions, if you like—that ought to 
make us wonder whether we really understand what we are saying when we espouse 
the basic assumptions. Working within the basic assumptions, one might allow that 
the child observes the uses of words in order to determine which of all the concepts 
he or she already has are the ones that people express in words, or that observations 
of the uses of words accelerate or stimulate a process of concept-formation that might 
have taken place even apart from those observations; but one will not allow that learn-
ing to use a word is just what acquiring a concept consists in, for then it would not 
make sense to describe language learning as, in Bloom’s words, a process of mapping 
words onto concepts. So one of the basic questions that needs to be answered by 
those who espouse the basic assumptions is: what does the child’s distinguishing be-
tween kinds consist in if not its knowledge how to use the words that stand for those 
kinds? 
 Typically, proponents of the basic assumptions hold that the process by which a 
child learns which words map into which concepts involves a kind of mind-reading. 
This is certainly an integral feature of Bloom’s account of language learning. The child 
is not supposed to rely on simple induction, generalizing from correlations between 
the uses of a word and the circumstances under which it is used. Rather, the child is 
supposed have some insight into what a speaker is, on a given occasion, trying to say. 
The child’s hypothesis will be that the concepts that the speaker’s words are mapped 
onto are those that comprise the thought that the speaker is attempting to convey. 
The obvious question this raises is: how can a child who cannot even talk yet form 
hypotheses concerning the contents of a speaker’s communicative intention?  
 Perhaps the most basic question we can put to a proponent of the basic assump-
tions is this: How can something in the mind have a meaning and an extension? What 
is the relation between some thing in the brain, or some state of the brain, and the set 
of all dogs, or dogkind, such that we can say that that thing in the brain means dog? If 
the things in the mind that have meanings and extensions were themselves just spoken 
words, or were somehow derivative from spoken words, then in answering this ques-
                                                     
1 On this question, compare Carey and Xu (Carey and Xu 2001, Xu 2002), who hold that conceptual de-
velopment begins with a very broad object concept, and Goldstone and Barsalou who (1998), who 
conceive of concept formation of as process of abstraction from perception.  
2 On this question, see the debate between Lila Gleitman (Fisher, Hall, Rakowitz and Gleitman 1994) and 
Steven Pinker (1994). 
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tion we could appeal to the role that words play in interpersonal exchange. But if we 
have to answer the question without identifying concepts with words, then we will 
have to answer in a different way. For example, we might look for correlations be-
tween the activation (or “tokening”) of a concept and events in the external world. Or 
we might posit some kind of mapping relation between whole structures of mental 
representations and structures in the world. Or we might look for an answer in terms 
of the functional role that concepts play in the processes of problem-solving. But 
these approaches have been tried, repeatedly, in philosophy, and all of them have run 
up against some very basic objections. (For my own criticisms, see my 1994, chapter 3, 
1995, 2003, chapter 2). At this point in history, a more promising strategy (if only be-
cause it has not been refuted yet) is to seek an account of linguistic meaning in terms 
of the norms of discourse that govern interpersonal cooperation by means of lan-
guage. 
2. Conceptual thought versus similarity judgments 
In order to have a good reason to persevere with the basic assumptions even in the 
absence of answers to the basic questions, we should be able to cite some direct evi-
dence for the basic assumptions in addition to the indirect evidence. In particular, 
there should be experimental evidence giving us good reason to believe that children 
do acquire concepts apart from language. But in fact, it seems to me that we really 
have no evidence for that at all. I cannot here examine every line of research that 
someone might cite as promising, but I will look closely at one representative line of 
research and argue that it simply does not show what it is supposed to show. In my 
critique of this experimental work, I will rely on a distinction between conceptual thought 
and what I call similarity judgments. So I need to begin by drawing that distinction and 
explaining why similarity judgments in my sense are not a species of conceptual 
thought.  
 As I define it, a basic conceptual thought is a representation of a particular as be-
longing to some kind or of some particulars as standing in some relation. For exam-
ple, my thought that this is a chair is a basic conceptual thought because it represents 
this, a particular, as belonging to the kind chair. In saying this, I take for granted that an 
agent represents a particular as belonging to a kind only in so far as he or she con-
ceives of the kind as bounded in some way, although those boundaries may be vague. 
So someone who can think of this particular as a chair can also think of this table as 
not a chair. In addition to such basic conceptual thoughts there are other thoughts that 
qualify as conceptual thoughts because they are inferentially related to basic conceptual 
thoughts. For example, since This is a dog is a conceptual thought, and This is vicious is a 
conceptual thought, the thought Some dogs are vicious is a conceptual thought as well, 
since it is inferentially related to the first two. 
 What I call a similarity judgment is a representation of a relation among three things. 
If given three things x, y and z, an agent A represents x as more like y than like z, then 
that representation in A is a similarity judgment. One kind of similarity judgment is 
indeed a species of conceptual thought, as I have defined this. If an agent accepts the 
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proposition that x, y and z bear the 3-place similarity relation to one another, then the agent will 
have a basic conceptual thought whose content is that proposition. But it might also 
be possible for an agent to perceive x as more like y than like z or to imagine x as more 
like y than like z, and it is not obvious that such representations are basic conceptual 
thoughts. Even in cases where they are not, I will call these representations similarity 
judgments, although in such cases the term is misleading. 
 For example, consider the classic duck-rabbit (the ambiguous figure from Wittgen-
stein’s Philosophical Investigations). It is tempting to suppose that when I perceive the 
duck-rabbit as a duck, what I do is subsume it under my concept duck, and that when I 
perceive it as rabbit, I subsume it under my concept rabbit. But seeing-as does not 
have to be understood as a matter of subsuming things under concepts in this way. 
Instead, it may be understood as a matter of perceiving a three-place similarity rela-
tion. When I see the duck-rabbit as a duck, what may be happening may be something 
like the following: I have in mind a visual image of a particular duck and a visual image 
of a particular rabbit; by means of these images, I compare the duck-rabbit with the 
duck and the rabbit; and I perceive this thing [the duck-rabbit] as more like this thing 
[the duck] than like that thing [the rabbit]. Of course, when we see the duck-rabbit as 
a duck, we may not have in mind a visual image of any particular duck, and so what 
goes on in us cannot be exactly what I have described. But we have seen ducks and 
rabbits and can imagine them if we choose. So there are imagistic representations of 
ducks and rabbits somewhere in our minds that are not in any obvious sense concep-
tual representations; so we may be able to compare the duck-rabbit to ducks and rab-
bits via imagistic representations and thereby, without making use of any conceptual 
representations of ducks and rabbits, perceive the duck-rabbit as more like a duck 
than like a rabbit. 
 Off hand, these similarity judgments might seem to rest on the application of con-
cepts. (Certainly many people have assumed so. See for example, Medin and Gold-
stone 1995.) To represent x as more like y than like z, it might be said, is to judge that x 
and y have some property in common that z lacks. But I do not think that that should 
be just obvious. Consider the three figures in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a 
b c 
FIGURE 1 
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The reader will recognize that in one way a is more like b than like c. In representing a 
as more like b than like c in this way, is it obvious that we are thinking of some property 
that a and b have in common that c lacks? I think that should not be obvious. If that is 
obvious, then it should be obvious also whether a fourth figure, in Figure 2, has that 
property or not.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
d 
FIGURE 2 
 
But surely the reader will not think that it is just obvious that in representing a as more 
like b than like c he or she had in mind a category (whether precisely defined or vague) 
that either did or did not include figure d. For example, we should not say that what a 
and b have in common that c lacks is linearity or lack of curvature, so that in recognizing 
the similarity between a and b we applied the concept of linearity or the concept of 
lack of curvature, because we can easily imagine figures that possess these properties 
but are far less like a than c is. Consequently, it is questionable whether in representing 
a as more like b than like c, one has to have in mind some more or less definite prop-
erty that a and b have in common that c lacks. 
3. The Quinn paradigm 
So I ask the reader to consider the possibility that there might be a kind of representa-
tion of similarity that does not reduce to the application of concepts. With that possi-
bility in mind, let us examine some purported evidence for the existence of concepts 
in prelinguistic children. The research program that I will examine is that of Paul C. 
Quinn of the University of Delaware. (Much of Quinn’s research has been done in 
collaboration with Peter Eimas of Brown University.) I think it is important to look at 
Quinn’s research because it is one of the few sustained attempts that I know of to 
demonstrate the presence of concepts in prelinguistic children.3
 Quinn’s experiments use a looking-time measure to test for concepts in infants 
who are just 3 or 4 months old and so not able to talk at all. In one version of the ex-
periment (Quinn and Eimas 1998, experiment 2), Quinn showed infants (48 of them) 
                                                     
3 The object-tracking research of Spelke (1990), Baillargeon (Wilcox and Baillargeon 1998), Carey and Xu 
(Carey and Xu 2001, Xu 2000) has been advertised as an investigation into the child’s concept of object, 
but that research does not even purport to show that children subsume particular objects under vari-
ous kinds. 
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a series of six pairs of pictures of cats, all different (randomly selected from a set of 
18). While observing the infants through a peephole in the middle of the display, he 
carefully measured how much time they spent looking at each picture. Then he sho-
wed them a pair containing a novel cat and something from a different category, a 
human. He found that the infants looked reliably longer at the picture of the human. 
What he concludes from this is that the infants possess a “category representation” of 
cats. In other studies, he has used pictures of birds and dogs as well as cats (Quinn, 
Eimas and Rosenkrantz 1993), and pictures of humans, horses, fish and cars (Quinn 
and Eimas 1998, experiment 1B). He has also sought to identify the features of the 
animals on which children base their looking-time decisions (Quinn and Eimas 1996, 
Quinn, Eimas and Tarr 2001). Side experiments are performed to demonstrate that 
the infants are able to discriminate between individual exemplars and to demonstrate 
that the infants do not simply have a prior preference for one kind of object over an-
other (or to provide a measure of this preference which can then be taken into ac-
count in interpreting the results of the main experiments). I should note also that 
Quinn thinks of himself as instilling category representations in the infants during the 
course of the experiment rather than as revealing category representations that they 
had already formed (Quinn 2002b, pp. 170-171). 
 Quinn formulates his conclusions with sometimes more, sometimes less caution. 
Here is one of his less cautious formulations (from Current Directions in Psychological Sci-
ence):  
A lingering tradition has been to consider the acquisition of category representations to be a late 
achievement (i.e., of childhood or even early adolescence) that is dependent on the emergence of 
naming and language, the receipt of formal instruction, and the possession of logical reasoning 
skills …  
Generalization of familiarization to the novel instance from the familiar category and a prefer-
ence for the novel instance from the novel category (measured in looking time) are taken as evi-
dence that the infants have on some basis grouped together, or categorized, the instances from 
the familiar category and recognized that the novel instance from the novel category does not be-
long to this grouping (or category representation). (2002a, pp. 66-67) 
In the first part of this quotation, Quinn makes clear who is on the other side, namely, 
those who think that language is necessary for concepts. He does not explicitly say 
that this is wrong, but it is clear from the context that he sets himself against it. In the 
second part of this quotation, the idea that the child has mentally grouped things is ex-
plicit. (For a more cautious formulation, see Quinn and Eimas 1996, p. 190.) 
 I do not believe that Quinn’s experiments provide any evidence that the infants 
form a mental representation of a category. The results can be explained at least as 
well by supposing that the child is merely making the sort of three-place similarity 
judgment that I have described. When, after seeing a lot of cats, the child gets a pic-
ture of a human, the child, as it were, says to itself, “This thing [the human] is less like 
this thing [the cat with which it is paired] than any of those other things [the cats it 
had already been shown] were like it”. Or, to put it the other way around, “Each of 
these things [the other cats] is more like this thing [the new cat] than that thing [the 
human] is like it”. Assuming that, given a choice between two things, the child prefers 
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to look at the one that it perceives as least like the other things it has been seeing re-
cently, we will get the looking-time results that Quinn does in fact get. (Obviously, 
since what I need here is an explanation that does not rest on conceptual thought, 
these quotations of the child’s thought are to be taken only as pointing to a mental 
process that is not literally a tokening of a sentence in any kind of language, whether 
English or mentalese. The “real nature” of these so-called “judgments” might be one 
that we can explain only in neurophysiological terms.) 
 In terms of such three-place similarity judgments we might be able to explain cer-
tain features of Quinn’s results even better than he can. With certain pairs of catego-
ries, his results are asymmetrical. When infants are familiarized to pictures of cats, they 
look longer at a picture of a human. But when they are familiarized to pictures of hu-
mans, they do not look reliably longer at a picture of a cat (Quinn and Eimas 1998, 
experiment 2). The same asymmetry is found in the comparison between humans and 
horses (experiment 1B). Similarly, when infants are familiarized to pictures of cats, 
they look longer at a picture of a dog; but when they are familiarized to pictures of 
dogs, they do not look longer at a picture of a cat (Quinn, Eimas and Rosenkrantz, 
1993).  
 My own view is that we can easily explain the asymmetry in terms of three-place 
similarity judgments. Suppose we have a group of cat pictures⎯call it CAT⎯and a 
group of human pictures⎯call it HUMAN. And suppose we collect (somehow) an in-
fant’s three-place similarity judgments over all triples of the members of the union of 
these two sets. And suppose that on the basis of those we construct a multidimen-
sional scaling (dimensions unspecified) in which similarity between the objects repre-
sented by the points is inversely related to the distance between the points. It is not at 
all implausible that we will find that the points representing individual humans occupy 
a broader region of this similarity space than the points representing individual cats, as 
depicted in Figure 3. (The points in the diagram represent representations in the mind 
of an infant, which in turn represent photographs of cats and humans, which in turn 
represent particular cats and humans.) 
 
 
 
CAT 
HUMAN 
a
b
c
d
FIGURE 3 
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 Now suppose that an infant is familiarized to pictures of cats and then is given the 
human/cat pair 〈b, c〉 (in Figure 3). Can the infant, as it were, say to itself that the 
novel human, b, is less like the novel cat, c, than any of the other members of the cat 
group is like c? Well, yes. So the human gets its attention. Next, suppose an infant is 
familiarized to pictures of humans and then is shown the pair 〈b, c〉. Can the infant say 
to itself that the novel cat, c, is less like the novel human, b, than any of the other 
members of the human group is like b? Well, no. So the novel cat does not get its at-
tention. We can explain in exactly the same way why the infants familiarized to cats 
looked longer at a dog while the infants familiarized to dogs did not look longer at a 
cat, on the plausible assumption that the points representing individual dogs occupy a 
broader region of similarity space than the points representing individual cats. 
 In reply to this explanation, someone might object that in giving this explanation I 
myself have posited mental representations of the HUMAN category and the CAT 
category. But in fact, I have not done that. In representing the distribution of points in 
similarity space, I drew a circle around the dots representing pictures of humans and a 
circle around the dots representing pictures of cats. But those circles are just to indi-
cate to the reader which points are which. Those circles may represent nothing psy-
chologically real in the infants at all. My claim is that Quinn’s results can be explained 
on the supposition that the infants possess a seamless, boundary-less, similarity space 
expressed in their similarity judgments. There is no need to suppose that they some-
how group the humans together within one boundary and the cats together within an-
other. 
 Quinn has his own explanation of the asymmetries. Quinn’s explanation of the 
cat/dog asymmetry is that, for the infants, the category for the cats is strictly included 
within a broader category that also includes all the dogs (2002b, p. 174). He considers 
this to be a plausible hypothesis inasmuch as an analysis of the pictures used in his ex-
periments reveals that, when objective measurements are taken of properties such as 
eye separation and ear length (in the pictures, not on the animals), “in almost all cases 
the distribution of each dog trait … subsumed the distribution for the corresponding 
trait for cats” (2002b, p. 174). What he means by that is that for each of these traits, 
most of the bell curve representing the distribution for cats falls within the bell curve 
representing the distribution for dogs. 
 To this, I say three things. First, this explanation of the asymmetry assumes that 
when the infants look at the pictures they do not see the pictures as representations of 
animals having characteristic dog size and characteristic cat size. If they do see the pic-
tures as pictures of animals with their characteristic sizes, then they will surely not 
think of the eye-separation distances for the cats as falling within the range of the eye-
separation distances for the dogs. Second, this explanation of why the infants familiar-
ized to dogs do not look longer at a cat threatens to undermine Quinn’s explanation 
of why the infants familiarized to cats look longer at dogs. If the category for the cats 
is strictly included within the category for the dogs, then we should find some dogs 
that fall within the cat category, and the infants familiarized to cats will not look 
longer at those dogs. Quinn does not report any such result. Third, if we do obtain 
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such a result and so are justified in thinking of the region of similarity space contain-
ing the cats as strictly included in the region containing the dogs, then we will be able 
to explain the data in terms of three-place similarity relations without positing any 
mental boundary around the cat region: Object x rather than object y elicits the in-
fant’s attention if and only if x is less like the things that the infant has been looking at 
recently than y is. 
 In any case, Quinn believes he needs to give a different explanation of the 
cat/human asymmetry. He thinks he cannot explain that asymmetry in the same way 
he explains the cat/dog asymmetry because when undergraduate subjects were asked 
to rate the typicality of the members of the three sets of pictures, it emerged that they 
regarded the humans as less variable than the cats and the dogs (Quinn and Eimas 
1998, p. 155; Quinn 2001b, p. 178). In explanation of the cat/human asymmetry, 
Quinn says various things. One thing he says is that “the representation of humans in 
psychological space is extremely broad” so that animals such as cats and horses 
“would often not be sufficiently distant or distinct in psychological space from the 
many represented human exemplars to be preferred during test trials”. However a 
human will seem novel relative to cats and horses “as a consequence of the relatively 
narrow representation of cats and horses” (Quinn and Eimas 1998, p. 155). Another 
thing Quinn says is that the representations of humans are “individualistic in nature, 
that is to say, exemplar based, whereas the representations for cats and most likely for 
horses are based on some form of summary representation” (Quinn and Eimas 1998, 
p. 164). Also: “The extensive representation of humans would function as a percep-
tual magnet or reference point that attracts other species” (Quinn and Eimas 1998, p. 
155). (See also Quinn 2001b, pp. 178-179 and 186-187.)  
 In reply, I say, first, that I am not sure we can take the undergraduates’ typicality 
ratings of humans as a good indication of humans’ actual variability in psychological 
space. It is not hard to think of reasons why an undergraduate would be reluctant to 
rate a picture of, say, an Asian-American as not a typical human being, other than re-
garding humans as actually less variable than cats. Second, Quinn nowhere explains in 
literal language what the “magnet” metaphor is supposed to mean or how the magnet 
idea, whatever it is, can be used to explain his data. His claim that representations of 
humans are “individualistic in nature” is supposed to be supported by the finding that 
infants familiarized to human faces look longer at novel human faces than at faces 
they have already seen (2001b, p. 180), whereas the same does not hold for cats. But 
in his original report he can only say that this effect “approached significance” (Quinn 
and Eimas 1998, p. 164), not that it really was statistically significant, and in any case, 
the effect may be another consequence of the fact that humans occupy a broader re-
gion of psychological space than cats. Finally, Quinn’s hypothesis that the humans oc-
cupy a broader region of psychological space conflicts with his own claim that the 
humans are regarded as less variable than the cats. If we assume that the humans oc-
cupy a broader region of psychological space than the cats, then we can explain his da-
ta in just the way I have done in terms of three-place similarity judgments.  
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4. Thought without boundaries 
My alternative explanation of Quinn’s results leads to the following question: When 
do minds need to draw boundaries between points in their similarity spaces? There are 
various occasions for this, in fact. A squirrel needs to distinguish between a branch 
that is just close enough to leap to and another branch that is slightly too far. A baby 
needs to decide when it has waited long enough to be fed. In the present context, an 
important case is deciding to use a word. If I have in mind something that I want you 
to bring, I may have to draw a line between chairs and stools, so that I can decide 
whether to use the word “chair” or the word “stool”. Similarly, I might need to draw a 
line in order to decide between “nail” and “tack”, or “tree” and “shrub”.  
 Some of these boundaries are quite ephemeral. The squirrel can jump farther when 
it is not too tired, or too heavy. The baby can wait longer when it is not too hungry. 
Perhaps only the use of words requires mental boundaries that are more or less per-
manent, so that everyone who uses a word can count on everyone else to draw the 
boundary in roughly the same place. This observation suggests a radical hypothesis, 
one that defines the opposite end of the spectrum of opinion from that of the basic 
assumptions with which we began. This hypothesis, which I am about to state, can 
serve as the target that proponents of the basic assumptions need to shoot down, on 
the basis of experiment and observation viewed in the light of diverse conceptions of 
the mind. Here it is: Acquiring a concept is the very same thing as learning a word. 
 This hypothesis raises in turn a question about the nature of cognition. As I ob-
served at the start, the basic assumptions about language learning stem from a more 
general conception of the mind according to which all thought is conceptual thought. 
If we reject the basic assumptions, then we will have to posit some other kind of men-
tal-processing that could yield, among other things, language learning. So the further 
question is: what kind of thinking might that be? Here I have hinted at one kind of al-
ternative, in the distinction that I have drawn between conceptual thought and similar-
ity judgments. Generalizing from this one example, I contend that we might be able to 
explain a lot of problem-solving in terms of a kind of nonconceptual, imagistic thought. 
In particular, we might appeal to such imagistic thought to explain how the rudiments 
of language are acquired.  
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